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Nakamura, Hironobu; Kitao, Takahiko; Yamada, Hiroyuki; Kono, Soma; Kimura, Takashi; Tasaki, Takashi
Proceedings of INMM 59th Annual Meeting (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/07
Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanigawa, Masafumi; Mukai, Yasunobu; Nakamichi, Hideo; Umino, Yoshinori; Fujisaku, Sakae; Kimura, Takashi; Kurita, Tsutomu
Proceedings of INMM 56th Annual Meeting (Internet), 8 Pages, 2015/07
In the MOX handling facilities, many types and amount of nuclear materials (NM) that are relatively easy to access are used in a GB. In order to prevent unauthorized removal of NM from the GB by an insider, based on the Japanese regulation which was referred from INFCIRC/225 Rev.5, the 2 person rule are being introduced at the area where NM handling GB are installed. As an example of usage of the security counterplan for the detection of unauthorized removal of NM, a new proposal of detection concept for the unauthorized removal by operators were investigated with implementation of several experiments considering actual GB operation. In general, it is considered that normal concept is to use radiation monitor ( or neutron) to detect the event by checking the variation of monitoring data. However, it is thought that distinguish between authorized NM movement during operation and the unauthorized removal (sample bag-out from GB) is very difficult. To solve this subject, JAEA studied and proposes a new concept about negative pressure monitoring in the GB in addition to the radiation monitoring. It is thought that the hybrid monitoring concept between pressure and radiation provides the detection alarm for it with central alarm station (CAS) accurately and rapidly with high integrity, and helps to complement current 2 person rule.
Nakamura, Hironobu; Kuribayashi, Toshihiro; Umeda, Hisao; Yaegashi, Masahiro
no journal, ,
In the activity to understand the nuclear security in the testing research reactor, we conduct a presentation in the international regional workshop conducting by the IAEA. In the presentation, as the efforts by the operator in the testing research reactor, we report organization of testing research reactor in JAEA, strategic physical protection measures (no including detail of measures), information control, efforts of insider threat measures (trustworthiness program and cyber security, etc.) and activity of nuclear security culture ferment. In addition, as the role to keep the nuclear security appropriately, we explain the important points to conduct nuclear security, establishment of comprehensive nuclear security system and improvement of responce skills by training, in the operator's point of view.